From: Haunter@castles.com (Haunter) Newsgroups: alt.out-of-body Subject: Testing for "Survival" Evidence Date: Sat, 23 Sep 2000 06:00:04 GMT Organization: A.S.I./Psi -App/WCS Lines: 42 Message-ID: <3a0446c6.184771432@cnews.newsguy.com> NNTP-Posting-Host: p-799.newsdawg.com Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Newsreader: Forte Agent 1.5/32.452 Path: chonsp.franklin.ch!pfaff.ethz.ch!news-zh.switch.ch!news-ge.switch.ch!newsfeeds.belnet.be!news.belnet.be!cyclone.bc.net!newsfeed.stanford.edu!pln-w!spln!dex!extra.newsguy.com!newsp.newsguy.com!enews3 Xref: chonsp.franklin.ch alt.out-of-body:51938 Here's an interesting approach to test for "survival"...any volunteers? :-) ENCRYPTION ALGORITHMS IN SURVIVAL EVIDENCE By Michael Levin Genetics Department, Harvard Medical School, 200 Longwood Avenue, Boston, MA 02115 ABSTRACT: One type of evidence for life after death involves attempts to effect transmission of messages from a deceased person to a living one when the content of the message would have been impossible to obtain by other means. This kind of experiment is commonly criticized for the following flaw: If there is any way to check whether a putative message is correct (for instance, some record left by the deceased against which the message is to be checked), this automatically provides a possibility for the recipient to have cheated. Several variants of this idea (hand-encryption and padlock codes) have been used in the past. The issue of authentication in computer systems is a similar type of problem and has been dealt with extensively. This paper presents a suggestion that improves on previous methods in several ways. Trap-door algorithms are a class of mathematical encoding procedures that function in one direction only. Thus, a message may be encoded and only the encoded form may be made publicly available: no record of the original message is left at all, and thus the record cannot be used for cheating. The algorithm provides an easy way to determine whether one has obtained the message, but provides no way to obtain it barring contact with the only person who knew it (the deceased). When run on a computer, this method makes it a simple matter to arrange such experiments, and owing to the mathematical nature of the algorithm, makes potential successes compelling survival evidence. -- White Crow Society:Knowledge is the Antidote for Fear http://www.whitecrowsociety.com http://www.legendsmagazine.net/pan/rayn/rpm http://www.geocities.com/soho/gallery/3549/parapsy.htm ###### From: PZ Myers Newsgroups: alt.out-of-body Subject: Re: Testing for "Survival" Evidence Date: Sat, 23 Sep 2000 09:01:13 -0500 Organization: Nailbunny's Hammer Lines: 60 Message-ID: References: <3a0446c6.184771432@cnews.newsguy.com> NNTP-Posting-Host: p-037.newsdawg.com User-Agent: MT-NewsWatcher/3.0 (PPC) X-Homepage: http://homepage.mac.com/myers/ X-Face: .k!7leh{iTz*Ah$8`'u'O$.4Z9+jOYL|yvi39v4fL-Un]RqYdDRAg*#o{3f|Mkzf8+}'2AmMD7_7`BM/X]H1nvmSDn*M0vfiwKn^3R[Kr_o*'>L@wBpFy>X&moPw, Haunter@castles.com (Haunter) wrote: > Here's an interesting approach to test for "survival"...any > volunteers? :-) > > ENCRYPTION ALGORITHMS IN SURVIVAL EVIDENCE > > By Michael Levin > > Genetics Department, Harvard Medical School, 200 Longwood Avenue, > Boston, MA 02115 > > ABSTRACT: One type of evidence for life after death involves attempts > to effect transmission of messages from a deceased > person to a living one when the content of the message would have been > impossible to obtain by other means. This kind of > experiment is commonly criticized for the following flaw: If there is > any way to check whether a putative message is correct (for > instance, some record left by the deceased against which the message > is to be checked), this automatically provides a > possibility for the recipient to have cheated. Several variants of > this idea (hand-encryption and padlock codes) have been used > in the past. The issue of authentication in computer systems is a > similar type of problem and has been dealt with extensively. > This paper presents a suggestion that improves on previous methods in > several ways. Trap-door algorithms are a class of > mathematical encoding procedures that function in one direction only. > Thus, a message may be encoded and only the encoded > form may be made publicly available: no record of the original message > is left at all, and thus the record cannot be used for > cheating. Unless one has the key, and can encode and decode messages. > The algorithm provides an easy way to determine whether one > has obtained the message, but provides no way to > obtain it barring contact with the only person who knew it (the > deceased). When run on a computer, this method makes it a > simple matter to arrange such experiments, and owing to the > mathematical nature of the algorithm, makes potential successes > compelling survival evidence. Here we go again, another heap of useless abstracts from Haunter, and again I doubt that he's read any of the actual papers. This one is just plain stupid. Note that we don't have any citation information. Where was this thing published, if it was? The only thing that Haunter seems to think was relevant is that Levin is at Harvard Genetics...but so what? That does not qualify anyone to be particularly good at cryptography or have any special knowledge of life after death. It's also a simply idiotic premise. Do ghosts sit around their palm pilots after death, running messages through pgp so they can get an encrypted data stream? How do they transmit it? Do mediums go into a trance and say, "Dad says 'rT%oi YmMk^ uQWrt'"? -- PZ Myers ###### Path: chonsp.franklin.ch!not-for-mail From: Neil Franklin Newsgroups: alt.out-of-body Subject: Re: Testing for "Survival" Evidence Date: 23 Sep 2000 19:31:15 +0200 Organization: My own Private Self Lines: 161 Message-ID: <6u1yyb582j.fsf@chonsp.franklin.ch> References: <3a0446c6.184771432@cnews.newsguy.com> NNTP-Posting-Host: chonsp.franklin.ch X-Trace: chonsp.franklin.ch 969730276 1197 10.0.3.2 (23 Sep 2000 17:31:16 GMT) X-Complaints-To: news@chonsp.franklin.ch NNTP-Posting-Date: 23 Sep 2000 17:31:16 GMT X-Newsreader: Gnus v5.7/Emacs 20.4 Xref: chonsp.franklin.ch alt.out-of-body:51973 PZ Myers writes: > In article <3a0446c6.184771432@cnews.newsguy.com>, Haunter@castles.com > (Haunter) wrote: > > > Here's an interesting approach to test for "survival"...any > > volunteers? :-) Potential candidates would be any person who has died and left behind them a password protected account on an Unix computer (or any other type that employs trap door functions to store passwords). > > in the past. The issue of authentication in computer systems is a > > similar type of problem and has been dealt with extensively. Same problem. How can B (a computer checking if login is allowed) prove that the person attempting login is A (legitimate user) and not C (imposter). Take a secret (passwort) known to A, hash it (done by the /bin/passwd program when the account is new) and store the hash (in the File /etc/passwd). When A or C want to login, demand the secret password, re-hash the entered claimed password and compare with the pre-stored hash (done by /bin/login). If the hashes are identical the person demanding login knows the secret and is A (unless A has leaked the secret to C). > > This paper presents a suggestion that improves on previous methods in > > several ways. Trap-door algorithms are a class of > > mathematical encoding procedures that function in one direction only. Small caveat: There exists no mathematical proof, that trap doors are non-reversible. There simply exists after decades of research no publically known method to defeat them. They are regarded as safe enough, that electronic signature laws trust them enough to give them the same standing as hand writing on paper. > > Thus, a message may be encoded and only the encoded > > form may be made publicly available: no record of the original message > > is left at all, and thus the record cannot be used for > > cheating. > > Unless one has the key, and can encode and decode messages. What key? Trap door functions do not use keys. Simple: hash = tdf(plain) not as in encryption which is: plain = f2(crypt, key2), where crypt=f1(plain,key1) > > The algorithm provides an easy way to determine whether one > > has obtained the message, but provides no way to > > obtain it barring contact with the only person who knew it (the > > deceased). Small caveat: this contact could have been secretly before deceasing. So you will need to get enough test cases to make that unlikely. > > When run on a computer, this method makes it a > > simple matter to arrange such experiments, No need to arrange. Any dead person who took the secret of an password with them (assuming the hashed form has not been deleted due to the account being closed). > > and owing to the > > mathematical nature of the algorithm, makes potential successes > > compelling survival evidence. Unless the medium also knew the password beforehand. > Here we go again, another heap of useless abstracts from Haunter, and Actually an report on an interesting idea for an test. > This one is just > plain stupid. About as stupid as trying to prove anything else. God, are all these scientists stupid people. > Note that we don't have any citation information. Where was this thing No need, as this is simply reporting on an idea to do, not on an actual experiment that has been run. No need to check it up. Now if someone had run the experiment with success then you would want to check up on them. > not qualify anyone to be particularly good at cryptography Trapdoor argorithms are cryptographical standard fare since decades. [1] [1] try Bruce Schneier, Applied Cryptography, John Wiley & Sons, 1996, ISBN 0-471-12845-7, _the_ standard work on cryptography, chapter "One-Way Functions, or any of the over 1600 references in the back of it PZ, I just hope your claims in biological/neurological stuff (which I can not verify due to lack of knowledge in that field) are better than the lack of knowledge of standard kryptographiv methods you have demonstrated in this post. > or have any > special knowledge of life after death. No need for that to design an experiment. If the secret is found, then one has proved that something is getting through from an deceised. > It's also a simply idiotic premise. Do ghosts sit around their palm > pilots after death, running messages through pgp so they can get an > encrypted data stream? Nope. They just happen to take secrets with them to the grave and then the medium claims to have access to such secrets. And here somebody has just noticed an verifiable type of secret. > How do they transmit it? Research on how it works will then follow as scientists all over the world jump to find out more this new exiting extension of the known physical world. > Do mediums go into a > trance and say, "Dad says 'rT%oi YmMk^ uQWrt'"? As the test is to test their claims of recieving secrets from the dead, yes, one would use their standard setting and procedures. Recieving the proper password (as proven by successfull login) in enough cases to make it unlikely that the medium knew the password from pre-death meeting is exactly what would constitute an beyond-doubt proof of an psychical phenomen (either life after death + mediumship, or the ability of mediums to retrieve information from the past). Both would be a revolution in scientific knowledge. -- Neil Franklin, neil@franklin.ch.remove http://neil.franklin.ch/ Nerd, Geek, Hacker, Unix Guru, Sysadmin, Roleplayer, LARPer, Mystic ###### From: PZ Myers Newsgroups: alt.out-of-body Subject: Re: Testing for "Survival" Evidence Date: Sat, 23 Sep 2000 14:07:37 -0500 Organization: Nailbunny's Hammer Lines: 221 Message-ID: References: <3a0446c6.184771432@cnews.newsguy.com> <6u1yyb582j.fsf@chonsp.franklin.ch> NNTP-Posting-Host: p-066.newsdawg.com User-Agent: MT-NewsWatcher/3.0 (PPC) X-Homepage: http://homepage.mac.com/myers/ X-Face: .k!7leh{iTz*Ah$8`'u'O$.4Z9+jOYL|yvi39v4fL-Un]RqYdDRAg*#o{3f|Mkzf8+}'2AmMD7_7`BM/X]H1nvmSDn*M0vfiwKn^3R[Kr_o*'>L@wBpFy>X&moPw, Neil Franklin wrote: > PZ Myers writes: > > > In article <3a0446c6.184771432@cnews.newsguy.com>, Haunter@castles.com > > (Haunter) wrote: > > > > > Here's an interesting approach to test for "survival"...any > > > volunteers? :-) > > Potential candidates would be any person who has died and left behind > them a password protected account on an Unix computer (or any other > type that employs trap door functions to store passwords). > > > > > in the past. The issue of authentication in computer systems is a > > > similar type of problem and has been dealt with extensively. > > Same problem. How can B (a computer checking if login is allowed) > prove that the person attempting login is A (legitimate user) and not > C (imposter). > > Take a secret (passwort) known to A, hash it (done by the /bin/passwd > program when the account is new) and store the hash (in the File > /etc/passwd). When A or C want to login, demand the secret password, > re-hash the entered claimed password and compare with the pre-stored > hash (done by /bin/login). If the hashes are identical the person > demanding login knows the secret and is A (unless A has leaked the > secret to C). > > > > > This paper presents a suggestion that improves on previous methods in > > > several ways. Trap-door algorithms are a class of > > > mathematical encoding procedures that function in one direction only. > > Small caveat: There exists no mathematical proof, that trap doors are > non-reversible. There simply exists after decades of research no > publically known method to defeat them. > > They are regarded as safe enough, that electronic signature laws trust > them enough to give them the same standing as hand writing on paper. > > > > > Thus, a message may be encoded and only the encoded > > > form may be made publicly available: no record of the original message > > > is left at all, and thus the record cannot be used for > > > cheating. > > > > Unless one has the key, and can encode and decode messages. > > What key? Trap door functions do not use keys. Simple: > > hash = tdf(plain) > > not as in encryption which is: > > plain = f2(crypt, key2), where crypt=f1(plain,key1) Picky, picky. The point is that Person A, while living, has to assemble this algorithm, and pass it on to Person B, who will use the information to verify a potential message from Person A after his death. We still have the problem of maintaining the security of the method, so that Person B can't use it to fake messages, or that Person C couldn't beg, borrow, or steal the information beforehand. > > > > > The algorithm provides an easy way to determine whether one > > > has obtained the message, but provides no way to > > > obtain it barring contact with the only person who knew it (the > > > deceased). > > Small caveat: this contact could have been secretly before > deceasing. So you will need to get enough test cases to make that > unlikely. > > > > > When run on a computer, this method makes it a > > > simple matter to arrange such experiments, > > No need to arrange. Any dead person who took the secret of an password > with them (assuming the hashed form has not been deleted due to the > account being closed). > > > > > and owing to the > > > mathematical nature of the algorithm, makes potential successes > > > compelling survival evidence. > > Unless the medium also knew the password beforehand. > > > > Here we go again, another heap of useless abstracts from Haunter, and > > Actually an report on an interesting idea for an test. I disagree. We aren't seeing believable plain English messages from the dead; why should we expect them to start communicating in code? > > > > This one is just > > plain stupid. > > > About as stupid as trying to prove anything else. God, are all these > scientists stupid people. > > > > > Note that we don't have any citation information. Where was this thing > > No need, as this is simply reporting on an idea to do, not on an > actual experiment that has been run. No need to check it up. Now if > someone had run the experiment with success then you would want to > check up on them. Ah, you are ignoring Haunter's MO. He loves to associate people with advanced degrees with crackpot ideas, as if that gives the crackpottery some special credibility -- look at his shilling for Tart's TASTE project for an example. It's the same here: it's a mystery abstract, and all Haunter saw fit to inform us about was the author's affiliation. > > > > not qualify anyone to be particularly good at cryptography > > Trapdoor argorithms are cryptographical standard fare since decades. [1] > > [1] try Bruce Schneier, Applied Cryptography, John Wiley & Sons, 1996, > ISBN 0-471-12845-7, _the_ standard work on cryptography, chapter > "One-Way Functions, or any of the over 1600 references in the back of it > > > PZ, I just hope your claims in biological/neurological stuff (which > I can not verify due to lack of knowledge in that field) are better > than the lack of knowledge of standard kryptographiv methods you have > demonstrated in this post. I know very little about cryptography, which I freely admit. The point still stands. Adding the complication of cryptography to mediumship is an attempt to gild a garbage heap. It *might* be useful to verify the validity of a communications channel, but in this case, we don't seem to have a useable channel, we don't have a method for sharing cryptographic methods between sender and recipient, there is no a priori reason to think our mystical spiritual sender will have the capacity to execute 'hash = tdf(plain)', and the better the cryptographic scheme, the more dubious the result will be (that is, if the code is unbreakable, it just means that aspect will be touted heavily by the paranormalists...when the place where the scheme is most likely compromised is in code generation). > > > > or have any > > special knowledge of life after death. > > No need for that to design an experiment. If the secret is found, then > one has proved that something is getting through from an deceised. > > > > It's also a simply idiotic premise. Do ghosts sit around their palm > > pilots after death, running messages through pgp so they can get an > > encrypted data stream? > > Nope. They just happen to take secrets with them to the grave and then > the medium claims to have access to such secrets. And here somebody > has just noticed an verifiable type of secret. This is an idea that has been floating around for a long, long time. Houdini left such a message behind -- not encrypted, but locked up and held by someone he trusted. That was a far simpler procedure, and the mediums failed to get it. What does anyone gain from adding a cryptographic lock? It looks more impressive, is all. It's like Houdini's escape acts, adding multiple layers of locks and chains, many of which are misdirection -- when he gets through, it's by way of a back door that circumvents at least some of them. > > > > How do they transmit it? > > > Research on how it works will then follow as scientists all over the > world jump to find out more this new exiting extension of the known > physical world. > > > > > Do mediums go into a > > trance and say, "Dad says 'rT%oi YmMk^ uQWrt'"? > > As the test is to test their claims of recieving secrets from the dead, > yes, one would use their standard setting and procedures. > > Recieving the proper password (as proven by successfull login) in > enough cases to make it unlikely that the medium knew the password > from pre-death meeting is exactly what would constitute an > beyond-doubt proof of an psychical phenomen (either life after death + > mediumship, or the ability of mediums to retrieve information from the > past). Both would be a revolution in scientific knowledge. You forget your tags. It's a silly scheme because it just makes more elaborate a procedure that hasn't worked in the past. Why not just use the combinations for safes? Dying people could leave messages in a safe, for which they set the combination and lock it up tight. Then they just transmit the combination through the medium after death. Do you mean no one has thought of this before? Of course, there is still a major problem. Watch your favorite mediums in action sometime -- van Praagh, or Edwards, or whoever. They'll sputter out lines of BS like, "I'm getting a 'J' sound -- who had a loved one named Joe, or John, or Jim?" Do you think that approach will get them through on a computer looking for a specific password? -- PZ Myers ###### From: Haunter@castles.com (Haunter) Newsgroups: alt.out-of-body Subject: Re: Testing for "Survival" Evidence Date: Sat, 23 Sep 2000 19:50:42 GMT Organization: A.S.I./Psi -App/WCS Lines: 171 Message-ID: <39d008b8.234429029@cnews.newsguy.com> References: <3a0446c6.184771432@cnews.newsguy.com> <6u1yyb582j.fsf@chonsp.franklin.ch> NNTP-Posting-Host: p-050.newsdawg.com Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Newsreader: Forte Agent 1.5/32.452 Path: chonsp.franklin.ch!pfaff.ethz.ch!news-zh.switch.ch!newsfeed-zh.ip-plus.net!news.ip-plus.net!News.Amsterdam.UnisourceCS!skynet.be!newsfeed.stanford.edu!pln-w!spln!dex!extra.newsguy.com!newsp.newsguy.com!enews3 Xref: chonsp.franklin.ch alt.out-of-body:52030 On 23 Sep 2000 19:31:15 +0200, Neil Franklin wrote: >PZ Myers writes: > >> In article <3a0446c6.184771432@cnews.newsguy.com>, Haunter@castles.com >> (Haunter) wrote: >> >> > Here's an interesting approach to test for "survival"...any >> > volunteers? :-) > >Potential candidates would be any person who has died and left behind >them a password protected account on an Unix computer (or any other >type that employs trap door functions to store passwords). > > >> > in the past. The issue of authentication in computer systems is a >> > similar type of problem and has been dealt with extensively. > >Same problem. How can B (a computer checking if login is allowed) >prove that the person attempting login is A (legitimate user) and not >C (imposter). > >Take a secret (passwort) known to A, hash it (done by the /bin/passwd >program when the account is new) and store the hash (in the File >/etc/passwd). When A or C want to login, demand the secret password, >re-hash the entered claimed password and compare with the pre-stored >hash (done by /bin/login). If the hashes are identical the person >demanding login knows the secret and is A (unless A has leaked the >secret to C). > > >> > This paper presents a suggestion that improves on previous methods in >> > several ways. Trap-door algorithms are a class of >> > mathematical encoding procedures that function in one direction only. > >Small caveat: There exists no mathematical proof, that trap doors are >non-reversible. There simply exists after decades of research no >publically known method to defeat them. > >They are regarded as safe enough, that electronic signature laws trust >them enough to give them the same standing as hand writing on paper. > > >> > Thus, a message may be encoded and only the encoded >> > form may be made publicly available: no record of the original message >> > is left at all, and thus the record cannot be used for >> > cheating. >> >> Unless one has the key, and can encode and decode messages. > >What key? Trap door functions do not use keys. Simple: > >hash = tdf(plain) > >not as in encryption which is: > >plain = f2(crypt, key2), where crypt=f1(plain,key1) > > >> > The algorithm provides an easy way to determine whether one >> > has obtained the message, but provides no way to >> > obtain it barring contact with the only person who knew it (the >> > deceased). > >Small caveat: this contact could have been secretly before >deceasing. So you will need to get enough test cases to make that >unlikely. > > >> > When run on a computer, this method makes it a >> > simple matter to arrange such experiments, > >No need to arrange. Any dead person who took the secret of an password >with them (assuming the hashed form has not been deleted due to the >account being closed). > > >> > and owing to the >> > mathematical nature of the algorithm, makes potential successes >> > compelling survival evidence. > >Unless the medium also knew the password beforehand. > > >> Here we go again, another heap of useless abstracts from Haunter, and > >Actually an report on an interesting idea for an test. > > >> This one is just >> plain stupid. > > >About as stupid as trying to prove anything else. God, are all these >scientists stupid people. > > > >> Note that we don't have any citation information. Where was this thing > >No need, as this is simply reporting on an idea to do, not on an >actual experiment that has been run. No need to check it up. Now if >someone had run the experiment with success then you would want to >check up on them. > > >> not qualify anyone to be particularly good at cryptography > >Trapdoor argorithms are cryptographical standard fare since decades. [1] > >[1] try Bruce Schneier, Applied Cryptography, John Wiley & Sons, 1996, >ISBN 0-471-12845-7, _the_ standard work on cryptography, chapter >"One-Way Functions, or any of the over 1600 references in the back of it > > >PZ, I just hope your claims in biological/neurological stuff (which >I can not verify due to lack of knowledge in that field) are better >than the lack of knowledge of standard kryptographiv methods you have >demonstrated in this post. > > >> or have any >> special knowledge of life after death. > >No need for that to design an experiment. If the secret is found, then >one has proved that something is getting through from an deceised. > > >> It's also a simply idiotic premise. Do ghosts sit around their palm >> pilots after death, running messages through pgp so they can get an >> encrypted data stream? > >Nope. They just happen to take secrets with them to the grave and then >the medium claims to have access to such secrets. And here somebody >has just noticed an verifiable type of secret. > > >> How do they transmit it? > > >Research on how it works will then follow as scientists all over the >world jump to find out more this new exiting extension of the known >physical world. > > > >> Do mediums go into a >> trance and say, "Dad says 'rT%oi YmMk^ uQWrt'"? > >As the test is to test their claims of recieving secrets from the dead, >yes, one would use their standard setting and procedures. > >Recieving the proper password (as proven by successfull login) in >enough cases to make it unlikely that the medium knew the password >from pre-death meeting is exactly what would constitute an >beyond-doubt proof of an psychical phenomen (either life after death + >mediumship, or the ability of mediums to retrieve information from the >past). Both would be a revolution in scientific knowledge. Thanks Neil, for an interesting, and reasoned response. I knew -somebody- out there would find it interesting and relevent. Since PZ is on autodelete, I rarely read any of his responses, but then, he's so predictable in his negativity, I'm rarely surprised when I do. -- White Crow Society:Knowledge is the Antidote for Fear http://www.whitecrowsociety.com http://www.legendsmagazine.net/pan/rayn/rpm http://www.geocities.com/soho/gallery/3549/parapsy.htm ###### Message-ID: <39CD1E52.41709C49@visi.net> From: John Garrison X-Mailer: Mozilla 4.73 [en] (X11; U; Linux 2.2.12-20 i586) X-Accept-Language: en MIME-Version: 1.0 Newsgroups: alt.out-of-body Subject: Re: Testing for "Survival" Evidence References: <3a0446c6.184771432@cnews.newsguy.com> <6u1yyb582j.fsf@chonsp.franklin.ch> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Lines: 122 Date: Sat, 23 Sep 2000 17:19:14 -0400 NNTP-Posting-Host: 209.8.199.97 X-Trace: firenze 969744134 209.8.199.97 (Sat, 23 Sep 2000 17:22:14 EDT) NNTP-Posting-Date: Sat, 23 Sep 2000 17:22:14 EDT Path: chonsp.franklin.ch!pfaff.ethz.ch!news-zh.switch.ch!newsfeed-zh.ip-plus.net!news.ip-plus.net!news.tesion.net!news.belwue.de!news.uni-stuttgart.de!rz.uni-karlsruhe.de!schlund.de!newsfeed01.sul.t-online.de!t-online.de!newspeer.clara.net!news.clara.net!feed2.onemain.com!feed1.onemain.com!feeder.qis.net!newsxfer.visi.net!206.246.194.3.MISMATCH!firenze!not-for-mail Xref: chonsp.franklin.ch alt.out-of-body:52087 PZ Myers wrote: > Picky, picky. The point is that Person A, while living, has to assemble > this algorithm, and pass it on to Person B, who will use the information > to verify a potential message from Person A after his death. We still > have the problem of maintaining the security of the method, so that > Person B can't use it to fake messages, or that Person C couldn't beg, > borrow, or steal the information beforehand. I think you are missing the point, there is no person B. Person B is the computer. For example, if I die right now, me and my computer will be the only ones who know my password. Since this isn't Windows, one can't just boot into dos mode and delete files to get into the system. The only way to get into the system is to know my password. (or hack in, which assuming the test computers aren't on networks would be very hard.) If you had a thousand computers and a thousand testees and a very large portion of the dead people still had access to their computers, then there is very little room for fraud. Unless of course all of the people participating in the study were to tell someone their password, which would be silly. Although I might point out that Harry Houdini, interested in the afterlife, told his wife a secret word. After he died he would relay the message back to her. Apparently he never did. So I'm not saying that such a test would work. I am merely saying that you are completely misunderstanding the point. > I disagree. We aren't seeing believable plain English messages from the > dead; why should we expect them to start communicating in code? Well, first of all it really wouldn't be "code", I mean it would be a set of letters and numbers which they are familiar with, they wouldn't have to encrypt if from the other side, so the difficulty level hasn't risen any. Secondly, it's not that were aren't seeing any believable plain English messages from the dead, it's that we have no way of ruling out things such as cold reading from these messages. That is the purpose of the test. > I know very little about cryptography, which I freely admit. > > The point still stands. Adding the complication of cryptography to > mediumship is an attempt to gild a garbage heap. It *might* be useful to > verify the validity of a communications channel, but in this case, we > don't seem to have a useable channel, we don't have a method for sharing > cryptographic methods between sender and recipient, there is no a priori > reason to think our mystical spiritual sender will have the capacity to > execute 'hash = tdf(plain)', and the better the cryptographic scheme, Maybe I have read it wrong, I thought that the dead person would have the encrypted code before he died and pass it on after his death. Say for example my unix password is "TgF58k" (which it is not) That would be the code that I pass on when I am dead. But that code is stored nowhere in the world, accept for in encrypted form on the computer. Therefore I don't have to encrypt anything after I die. And I don't know the encrypted form of "TgF58k" either. I know the password before it's encryption. It is the job of the encryption to insure that the password isn't known by anyone else. Of course they _could_ use real language words such as "JohnGarrison" (not it either) for the password, but that would allow for cold read guesses. But the point is that the dead person would only be remembering "JohnGarrison" not the encrypted version of "JohnGarrison". That is where the one-way encryption comes in. > the more dubious the result will be (that is, if the code is > unbreakable, it just means that aspect will be touted heavily by the > paranormalists...when the place where the scheme is most likely > compromised is in code generation). I don't understand this statement, could you clarify? If the code is heavily unbreakable and the mediums get in successfully, then that IS impressive, no? And if they don't get in, the fact that the code is unbreakable isn't a defense for the paranormalists, because if the mediums were really talking to the dead then they would no the correct passwords. It would help rule out cracking and make the test more solid on both sides. > > This is an idea that has been floating around for a long, long time. > Houdini left such a message behind -- not encrypted, but locked up and > held by someone he trusted. That was a far simpler procedure, and the > mediums failed to get it. What does anyone gain from adding a > cryptographic lock? It looks more impressive, is all. It's like > Houdini's escape acts, adding multiple layers of locks and chains, many > of which are misdirection -- when he gets through, it's by way of a back > door that circumvents at least some of them. Oops, I didn't read this whole post before responding this time, sorry for repeating what you said. But it was my impression that the only record of the message was in his wife's head. Did he really have a written copy locked away somewhere? > You forget your tags. > > It's a silly scheme because it just makes more elaborate a procedure > that hasn't worked in the past. Why not just use the combinations for > safes? Dying people could leave messages in a safe, for which they set > the combination and lock it up tight. Then they just transmit the > combination through the medium after death. Do you mean no one has > thought of this before? I agree with you here, it is the same exact principle, near as I can tell. But either way there is no person B. Person B is the safe or the computer, and I don't think they'll tell a soul! ;-) > Of course, there is still a major problem. Watch your favorite mediums > in action sometime -- van Praagh, or Edwards, or whoever. They'll > sputter out lines of BS like, "I'm getting a 'J' sound -- who had a > loved one named Joe, or John, or Jim?" Do you think that approach will > get them through on a computer looking for a specific password? While they have had significantly less broad "hits" than you give credit for, I agree with this for the most part. I think the problem is that science expects mediums to be able to set down and carry on a conversation with the dead just as easily with the living. I don't think it is unreasonable to think that that isn't possible, but I am sure that is just my woo-woo-ness speaking. -- "I'm willing to J.O.B., just not on no jagg-off shoe-shine tip" "Jagg-off shoe-shine tip?" "No *background-checking* jagg-off shoe-shine tip" ###### From: Sherilyn <582@sherilyn.org.uk> Newsgroups: alt.out-of-body Subject: Re: Testing for "Survival" Evidence Date: Sat, 23 Sep 2000 23:46:04 GMT Organization: Deja.com - Before you buy. Lines: 41 Message-ID: <8qjfbo$oe$1@nnrp1.deja.com> References: <3a0446c6.184771432@cnews.newsguy.com> <6u1yyb582j.fsf@chonsp.franklin.ch> NNTP-Posting-Host: 212.49.242.222 X-Article-Creation-Date: Sat Sep 23 23:46:04 2000 GMT X-Http-User-Agent: Mozilla/4.73 [en] (X11; I; Linux 2.2.17 i586) X-Http-Proxy: 1.0 x72.deja.com:80 (Squid/1.1.22) for client 212.49.242.222 X-MyDeja-Info: XMYDJUIDsutrice Path: chonsp.franklin.ch!pfaff.ethz.ch!news-zh.switch.ch!machtgarnix.switch.ch!news-ge.switch.ch!news.maxwell.syr.edu!nntp2.deja.com!nnrp1.deja.com!not-for-mail Xref: chonsp.franklin.ch alt.out-of-body:52007 In article , PZ Myers wrote: [...] > > Picky, picky. The point is that Person A, while living, has to assemble > this algorithm, and pass it on to Person B, who will use the information > to verify a potential message from Person A after his death. We still > have the problem of maintaining the security of the method, so that > Person B can't use it to fake messages, or that Person C couldn't beg, > borrow, or steal the information beforehand. There are some serious problems with any method of message encoding performed _before_ death, but the trapdoor functions do provide a potential solution to some of them. Possession of the algorithm and the encoded message would permit various methods of attack, including variants of the "dictionary" and "known plaintext" methods. None of us has read the paper (I presume), but if the authors had even my lay knowledge of cryptanalysis, I'm sure they would consider these weaknesses. The spirit world, one would think, must be simply brimming over with scientific information that is inacessible in the mortal realm. A few decent medium-relayed scientific discoveries would do wonders for the field of spiritualism, which seems to have been rather moribund since the early years of last century. Why in heaven, if they're so interersted in communicating with us, cannot the dead come up with some reliable methods? Are we to do it all by ourselves? :) [...] -- Email handle is time-encoded to foil spammers. Use recent handles only. Filter on domain name only. http://www.sherilyn.org.uk/ Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/ Before you buy. ###### From: Sherilyn <582@sherilyn.co.uk> Newsgroups: alt.out-of-body Subject: Re: Testing for "Survival" Evidence Date: 23 Sep 2000 18:14:12 -0700 Organization: Extra Newsguy News Service [http://extra.newsguy.com] Lines: 77 Message-ID: <8qjkh40lm9@edrn.newsguy.com> References: <3a0446c6.184771432@cnews.newsguy.com> <6u1yyb582j.fsf@chonsp.franklin.ch> <39CD1E52.41709C49@visi.net> NNTP-Posting-Host: p-601.newsdawg.com Path: chonsp.franklin.ch!pfaff.ethz.ch!news-zh.switch.ch!newsfeed-zh.ip-plus.net!news.ip-plus.net!news.tesion.net!news.belwue.de!news-stu1.dfn.de!news-mue1.dfn.de!news-nue1.dfn.de!uni-erlangen.de!newsfeed1.telenordia.se!news.algonet.se!algonet!news.tele.dk!171.64.14.106!newsfeed.stanford.edu!pln-w!spln!dex!extra.newsguy.com!newsp.newsguy.com!edrn Xref: chonsp.franklin.ch alt.out-of-body:52021 In article <39CD1E52.41709C49@visi.net>, John says... > >PZ Myers wrote: > >> Picky, picky. The point is that Person A, while living, has to assemble >> this algorithm, and pass it on to Person B, who will use the information >> to verify a potential message from Person A after his death. We still >> have the problem of maintaining the security of the method, so that >> Person B can't use it to fake messages, or that Person C couldn't beg, >> borrow, or steal the information beforehand. > >I think you are missing the point, there is no person B. Person B is the >computer. The computer did not produce the algorithms it uses. Humans did. In order to verify a candidate plaintext against the encrypted form left behind, you need to have a complete copy of the algorithm. This can be copied onto another computer and used to test candidate plaintexts, pretty much in the same way that hackers will copy an old-fashioned /etc/passwd and mount a dictionary attack. > For example, if I die right now, me and my computer will be >the only ones who know my password. And the computer can only recognise the right password when it's presented with it. Sure. >Since this isn't Windows, one can't >just boot into dos mode and delete files to get into the system. The >only way to get into the system is to know my password. (or hack in, >which assuming the test computers aren't on networks would be very >hard.) If you had a thousand computers and a thousand testees and a very >large portion of the dead people still had access to their computers, >then there is very little room for fraud. Unless of course all of the >people participating in the study were to tell someone their password, >which would be silly. Why would the dead people need access to their computers? >Although I might point out that Harry Houdini, interested in the >afterlife, told his wife a secret word. After he died he would relay the >message back to her. Apparently he never did. The medium tested in the television program you mentioned a week or so back also failed tests of this kind. [...] >Secondly, it's not that were aren't seeing any believable plain English >messages from the dead, it's that we have no way of ruling out things >such as cold reading from these messages. That is the purpose of the >test. Could you give an example of one of these alleged "believable plain English messages from the dead?" :) [...] >Of course they _could_ use real language words such as "JohnGarrison" >(not it either) for the password, but that would allow for cold read >guesses. But the point is that the dead person would only be remembering >"JohnGarrison" not the encrypted version of "JohnGarrison". That is >where the one-way encryption comes in. I think it would be an interesting exercise for someone to generate by truly random means (die-rolling, for instance) a message, which they then encrypt. This would be somewhat more secure than English plaintext. They should publish it widely well before they expect to die, but only after destroying the random plaintext. I think that there are still some pretty nigh insuperable methodological problems with this (it seems to me that you can't safeguard against the originator of the message whilst elicitly disclosing the plaintext whilst alive, for instance) but it might still be a fun party game to try, along the lines of Ouija board play. ###### From: PZ Myers Newsgroups: alt.out-of-body Subject: Re: Testing for "Survival" Evidence Date: Sat, 23 Sep 2000 21:16:47 -0500 Organization: Nailbunny's Hammer Lines: 156 Message-ID: References: <3a0446c6.184771432@cnews.newsguy.com> <6u1yyb582j.fsf@chonsp.franklin.ch> <39CD1E52.41709C49@visi.net> <8qjkh40lm9@edrn.newsguy.com> NNTP-Posting-Host: p-314.newsdawg.com User-Agent: MT-NewsWatcher/3.0 (PPC) X-Homepage: http://homepage.mac.com/myers/ X-Face: .k!7leh{iTz*Ah$8`'u'O$.4Z9+jOYL|yvi39v4fL-Un]RqYdDRAg*#o{3f|Mkzf8+}'2AmMD7_7`BM/X]H1nvmSDn*M0vfiwKn^3R[Kr_o*'>L@wBpFy>X&moPw, Sherilyn <582@sherilyn.co.uk> wrote: > In article <39CD1E52.41709C49@visi.net>, John says... > > > >PZ Myers wrote: > > > >> Picky, picky. The point is that Person A, while living, has to > >> assemble this algorithm, and pass it on to Person B, who will use > >> the information to verify a potential message from Person A after > >> his death. We still have the problem of maintaining the security > >> of the method, so that Person B can't use it to fake messages, or > >> that Person C couldn't beg, borrow, or steal the information > >> beforehand. > > > >I think you are missing the point, there is no person B. Person B is > >the computer. > > The computer did not produce the algorithms it uses. Humans did. In > order to verify a candidate plaintext against the encrypted form left > behind, you need to have a complete copy of the algorithm. This can > be copied onto another computer and used to test candidate > plaintexts, pretty much in the same way that hackers will copy an > old-fashioned /etc/passwd and mount a dictionary attack. > > > For example, if I die right now, me and my computer will be > >the only ones who know my password. > > And the computer can only recognise the right password when it's > presented with it. Sure. Yes, just as someone 50 years ago might die, taking with him the combination to a safe, or the location of the locker opened by the unlabeled key around his neck. This is nothing new. What I object to here is the idea that using a modern encryption method will somehow revolutionize this old, old idea. It will do quite the opposite. It will instead simply allow the medium to tout the impossibility of his/her task, bragging about how all the resources of the NSA couldn't possibly crack this scheme in a thousand years...and yet the medium could do it with one evening's seance. Unfortunately, the truth is that cracking these schemes is more profitably pursued by a little hacking of the human mind, rather than trying to hack the machine. I used to do this little trick routinely. Once upon a time, I was system manager for a VAX in a scientific institute. People would forget their passwords, or just have trouble typing them in. People would move on, or be on vacation, and somebody would realize there was some crucial bit of data stored in their account. I could have just reset their password, but often it was easier just to guess what it was. I was right amazingly often. It helped that these were a bunch of biologists, who weren't particularly concerned with computer security, and that I knew them all fairly well, but still... (in case anyone is interested in hacking a biologist's account somewhere, the most important things to know are a little latin, and the name of a few of their experimental animals.) (in case you are thinking of hacking *my* accounts, you're out of luck. I use a random character generator for at least a few of the characters in the pw.) If somebody *were* to try a test like the one suggested in Haunter's abstract, and succeeded, the thing I'd suspect to be much more probable than an actual communication from beyond is that the medium found a slip of paper taped to the back of a desk drawer (another hint from past experience). There are other problems. I wouldn't ask some dying person to commit to memory some arcane key that guards the encryption of something important. I have my doubts that it *could* be a really secure password, given that you are asking a dying person, with I would hope weightier things on his mind, to memorize it. And the thing so protected could not be particularly valuable -- it would be unwise to encrypt the access code needed to release the millions of dollars from the Swiss bank for your heirs -- so I can't quite see the dead making a trip back to give you the secret key you need to unlock the dirty limerick encrypted on your hard disk. > > > >Since this isn't Windows, one can't just boot into dos mode and > >delete files to get into the system. The only way to get into the > >system is to know my password. (or hack in, which assuming the test > >computers aren't on networks would be very hard.) If you had a > >thousand computers and a thousand testees and a very large portion > >of the dead people still had access to their computers, then there > >is very little room for fraud. Unless of course all of the people > >participating in the study were to tell someone their password, > >which would be silly. > > > Why would the dead people need access to their computers? Some people do get extraordinarily addicted to Quake, I understand. > > >Although I might point out that Harry Houdini, interested in the > >afterlife, told his wife a secret word. After he died he would relay > >the message back to her. Apparently he never did. > > The medium tested in the television program you mentioned a week or > so back also failed tests of this kind. > > [...] > > > >Secondly, it's not that were aren't seeing any believable plain > >English messages from the dead, it's that we have no way of ruling > >out things such as cold reading from these messages. That is the > >purpose of the test. > > > Could you give an example of one of these alleged "believable plain > English messages from the dead?" :) [...] Watch John Edwards sometime. (notice the sarcasm dripping from every letter, please) > > >Of course they _could_ use real language words such as > >"JohnGarrison" (not it either) for the password, but that would > >allow for cold read guesses. But the point is that the dead person > >would only be remembering "JohnGarrison" not the encrypted version > >of "JohnGarrison". That is where the one-way encryption comes in. > > > I think it would be an interesting exercise for someone to generate > by truly random means (die-rolling, for instance) a message, which > they then encrypt. This would be somewhat more secure than English > plaintext. They should publish it widely well before they expect to > die, but only after destroying the random plaintext. I think that > there are still some pretty nigh insuperable methodological problems > with this (it seems to me that you can't safeguard against the > originator of the message whilst elicitly disclosing the plaintext > whilst alive, for instance) but it might still be a fun party game to > try, along the lines of Ouija board play. This really doesn't make sense. The dead don't come back and say, "Hey, sweetie! I miss you, but the beach parties are lots of fun up here. You dropped your car keys behind the sofa cushions, and you've forgotten about that insurance policy -- the records are in an envelope on the top shelf of the bookcase." Heck, there are quite a few dead people I wouldn't mind spending a little time with in idle chit-chat -- they don't need to help me out in any material way. But they will come back and say, "If you use the key word "GWILKT", you can decrypt that random gobbledygook I left behind for you." Uh-huh. -- PZ Myers ###### Message-ID: <39CD669E.7C0FA76B@visi.net> From: John Garrison X-Mailer: Mozilla 4.73 [en] (X11; U; Linux 2.2.12-20 i586) X-Accept-Language: en MIME-Version: 1.0 Newsgroups: alt.out-of-body Subject: Re: Testing for "Survival" Evidence References: <3a0446c6.184771432@cnews.newsguy.com> <6u1yyb582j.fsf@chonsp.franklin.ch> <39CD1E52.41709C49@visi.net> <8qjkh40lm9@edrn.newsguy.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Lines: 118 Date: Sat, 23 Sep 2000 22:27:42 -0400 NNTP-Posting-Host: 209.8.199.97 X-Trace: firenze 969762641 209.8.199.97 (Sat, 23 Sep 2000 22:30:41 EDT) NNTP-Posting-Date: Sat, 23 Sep 2000 22:30:41 EDT Path: chonsp.franklin.ch!pfaff.ethz.ch!news-zh.switch.ch!newsfeed-zh.ip-plus.net!news.ip-plus.net!news.tesion.net!news.belwue.de!news.uni-stuttgart.de!rz.uni-karlsruhe.de!schlund.de!newsfeed01.sul.t-online.de!newsfeed00.sul.t-online.de!t-online.de!diablo.theplanet.net!newsfeed.icl.net!newsfeed.direct.ca!look.ca!newsxfer.visi.net!206.246.194.3.MISMATCH!firenze!not-for-mail Xref: chonsp.franklin.ch alt.out-of-body:52091 Sherilyn wrote: > >I think you are missing the point, there is no person B. Person B is the > >computer. > > The computer did not produce the algorithms it uses. Humans did. In > order to verify a candidate plaintext against the encrypted form left > behind, you need to have a complete copy of the algorithm. This can > be copied onto another computer and used to test candidate plaintexts, > pretty much in the same way that hackers will copy an old-fashioned > /etc/passwd and mount a dictionary attack. Well sure, I understand that, but I don't think that comes into a large amount of play. At any rate, a computer with an encrypted file is alot easier to trust than a Person B. > > For example, if I die right now, me and my computer will be > >the only ones who know my password. > > And the computer can only recognise the right password when it's > presented with it. Sure. Correct, and the encryption helps to prevent cracking, thus "false" hits. (although truth be told I don't know how many mediums out there are computer crackers in their spare time) > >Since this isn't Windows, one can't > >just boot into dos mode and delete files to get into the system. The > >only way to get into the system is to know my password. (or hack in, > >which assuming the test computers aren't on networks would be very > >hard.) If you had a thousand computers and a thousand testees and a very > >large portion of the dead people still had access to their computers, > >then there is very little room for fraud. Unless of course all of the > >people participating in the study were to tell someone their password, > >which would be silly. > > Why would the dead people need access to their computers? Well, you did say that you wanted them to find a better way to communicate with us! ;-) But seriously, getting access to the computers was just an example of using encryption to test for "survival" > >Although I might point out that Harry Houdini, interested in the > >afterlife, told his wife a secret word. After he died he would relay the > >message back to her. Apparently he never did. > > The medium tested in the television program you mentioned a week or so back > also failed tests of this kind. Sure, they probably mentioned it on the television program, that is where the mentioned Houdini's incidences, and exposed various other frauds. Such as the two that started the whole thing the Fox sisters. Who admitted to being frauds, then suddenly decided that they weren't. *note to potential frauds* If you are considering admitting it was a hoax realize that after that point there is no going back! > > >Secondly, it's not that were aren't seeing any believable plain English > >messages from the dead, it's that we have no way of ruling out things > >such as cold reading from these messages. That is the purpose of the > >test. > > Could you give an example of one of these alleged "believable plain English > messages from the dead?" :) Well, I could give lots of examples, but then you'd say that it was likely just cold reading, and then I'd point out that my point was that these studies help rule out cold reading and not that these instances were indeed "believable plain English messages" and then you would tell me that I DID mean that the messages were believable plain English messages and accuse me of backpedalling. Sorry Sherilyn, I enjoy this nice rational conversation too much to start playing that game again. ;-) > I think it would be an interesting exercise for someone to generate by > truly random means (die-rolling, for instance) a message, which they > then encrypt. This would be somewhat more secure than English plaintext. That is why my first example was a randomly chosen set of letters, from my head though as opposed to dice. The usage of real words would make guessing far to easy. > They should publish it widely well before they expect to die, but only > after destroying the random plaintext. I don't know that I agree with that. I think that one or two trusted sources should be given the file. If the file is mass distributed the chances of someone cracking the encryption and tainting the experiment is to great, and the mere possibility would be enough for most skeptics to rule out any positive results that were made. > I think that there are still some > pretty nigh insuperable methodological problems with this (it seems to > me that you can't safeguard against the originator of the message whilst > elicitly disclosing the plaintext whilst alive, for instance) That's true. > but it might > still be a fun party game to try, along the lines of Ouija board play. Oddly enough my "Psychic Circle" (it's like a Ouija board) form much more coherent thought when I use it with believe less. When I use it with the friend that is really into all this it just spouts nonsense. I did meet Elvis on it one time. Not our Elvis mind you. This one was from Pluto! He even taught me a few of his words. hehe. Do I have to put a disclaimer saying that I don't take the Elvis thing seriously? It was fun however seeing what "words" spouted out. All of them were even pronouncable! hehe. -- "I'm willing to J.O.B., just not on no jagg-off shoe-shine tip" "Jagg-off shoe-shine tip?" "No *background-checking* jagg-off shoe-shine tip" ###### From: "B.D. Yager" Newsgroups: alt.out-of-body References: <3a0446c6.184771432@cnews.newsguy.com> Subject: Re: Testing for "Survival" Evidence Lines: 54 X-Newsreader: Microsoft Outlook Express 4.72.3110.1 X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V4.72.3110.3 Message-ID: Date: Sun, 24 Sep 2000 02:19:19 -0500 NNTP-Posting-Host: 156.46.129.192 X-Complaints-To: abuse@alpha.net X-Trace: homer.alpha.net 969779757 156.46.129.192 (Sun, 24 Sep 2000 02:15:57 CDT) NNTP-Posting-Date: Sun, 24 Sep 2000 02:15:57 CDT Path: chonsp.franklin.ch!pfaff.ethz.ch!news-zh.switch.ch!newsfeed-zh.ip-plus.net!news.ip-plus.net!news.tesion.net!news.belwue.de!informatik.tu-muenchen.de!news.informatik.uni-muenchen.de!uni-erlangen.de!newsfeed.germany.net!newsfeed01.sul.t-online.de!newsfeed00.sul.t-online.de!t-online.de!news-spur1.maxwell.syr.edu!news.maxwell.syr.edu!cpk-news-hub1.bbnplanet.com!cambridge1-snf1.gtei.net!news.gtei.net!homer.alpha.net!not-for-mail Xref: chonsp.franklin.ch alt.out-of-body:52036 Hello Haunter-Dude! :) While this may be interesting... IMO, it's a bit moot. Why? Because (IMO)... once a person is deceased, he/she ceases to see anything but folly in the efforts of the living to "prove" anything about the other side. They will find out, soon enough... one at a time! B.D. Haunter wrote in message <3a0446c6.184771432@cnews.newsguy.com>... >Here's an interesting approach to test for "survival"...any >volunteers? :-) > >ENCRYPTION ALGORITHMS IN SURVIVAL EVIDENCE > >By Michael Levin > >Genetics Department, Harvard Medical School, 200 Longwood Avenue, >Boston, MA 02115 > >ABSTRACT: One type of evidence for life after death involves attempts >to effect transmission of messages from a deceased >person to a living one when the content of the message would have been >impossible to obtain by other means. This kind of >experiment is commonly criticized for the following flaw: If there is >any way to check whether a putative message is correct (for >instance, some record left by the deceased against which the message >is to be checked), this automatically provides a >possibility for the recipient to have cheated. Several variants of >this idea (hand-encryption and padlock codes) have been used >in the past. The issue of authentication in computer systems is a >similar type of problem and has been dealt with extensively. >This paper presents a suggestion that improves on previous methods in >several ways. Trap-door algorithms are a class of >mathematical encoding procedures that function in one direction only. >Thus, a message may be encoded and only the encoded >form may be made publicly available: no record of the original message >is left at all, and thus the record cannot be used for >cheating. The algorithm provides an easy way to determine whether one >has obtained the message, but provides no way to >obtain it barring contact with the only person who knew it (the >deceased). When run on a computer, this method makes it a >simple matter to arrange such experiments, and owing to the >mathematical nature of the algorithm, makes potential successes >compelling survival evidence. > >-- > >White Crow Society:Knowledge is the Antidote for Fear >http://www.whitecrowsociety.com >http://www.legendsmagazine.net/pan/rayn/rpm >http://www.geocities.com/soho/gallery/3549/parapsy.htm ###### From: Sherilyn <582@sherilyn.org.uk> Newsgroups: alt.out-of-body Subject: Re: Testing for "Survival" Evidence Date: Sun, 24 Sep 2000 12:11:23 GMT Organization: Deja.com - Before you buy. Lines: 98 Message-ID: <8qkr14$ec5$1@nnrp1.deja.com> References: <3a0446c6.184771432@cnews.newsguy.com> <6u1yyb582j.fsf@chonsp.franklin.ch> <39CD1E52.41709C49@visi.net> <8qjkh40lm9@edrn.newsguy.com> <39CD669E.7C0FA76B@visi.net> NNTP-Posting-Host: 212.49.228.152 X-Article-Creation-Date: Sun Sep 24 12:11:23 2000 GMT X-Http-User-Agent: Mozilla/4.73 [en] (X11; I; Linux 2.2.17 i586) X-Http-Proxy: 1.0 x69.deja.com:80 (Squid/1.1.22) for client 212.49.228.152 X-MyDeja-Info: XMYDJUIDsutrice Path: chonsp.franklin.ch!pfaff.ethz.ch!news-zh.switch.ch!newsfeed-zh.ip-plus.net!news.ip-plus.net!news.tesion.net!news.belwue.de!news-stu1.dfn.de!news-koe1.dfn.de!news.ruhrgebiet.individual.net!newsfeed.ision.net!ision!cpk-news-hub1.bbnplanet.com!news.gtei.net!nntp2.deja.com!nnrp1.deja.com!not-for-mail Xref: chonsp.franklin.ch alt.out-of-body:52004 In article <39CD669E.7C0FA76B@visi.net>, John Garrison wrote: > Sherilyn wrote: > > > >I think you are missing the point, there is no person B. Person B is the > > >computer. > > > > The computer did not produce the algorithms it uses. Humans did. In > > order to verify a candidate plaintext against the encrypted form left > > behind, you need to have a complete copy of the algorithm. This can > > be copied onto another computer and used to test candidate plaintexts, > > pretty much in the same way that hackers will copy an old-fashioned > > /etc/passwd and mount a dictionary attack. > > Well sure, I understand that, but I don't think that comes into a large > amount of play. At any rate, a computer with an encrypted file is alot > easier to trust than a Person B. If the algorithm and encrypted message are public (and they'd have to be) you still have to trust Person B not to crack it. [...] > > > > And the computer can only recognise the right password when it's > > presented with it. Sure. > > Correct, and the encryption helps to prevent cracking, thus "false" > hits. (although truth be told I don't know how many mediums out there > are computer crackers in their spare time) There are many computer crackers, and some of them are going to regard any encryption scheme a challenge. [...] > > > > Could you give an example of one of these alleged "believable plain English > > messages from the dead?" :) > > Well, I could give lots of examples, but then you'd say that it was > likely just cold reading, and then I'd point out that my point was that > these studies help rule out cold reading and not that these instances > were indeed "believable plain English messages" and then you would tell > me that I DID mean that the messages were believable plain English > messages and accuse me of backpedalling. Sorry Sherilyn, I enjoy this > nice rational conversation too much to start playing that game again. What is rational about claiming that there are believable messages from the dead when you have now admitted that they could be cold reads? You _have_ back-pedalled, and radically so. > ;-) Indeed, if it is no longer necessary for me to go through the tedious, painstaking and repetitive process of pointing out your over-ambitious claims, then the past two weeks have been well spent. [...] > > > They should publish it widely well before they expect to die, but only > > after destroying the random plaintext. > > I don't know that I agree with that. I think that one or two trusted > sources should be given the file. If the file is mass distributed the > chances of someone cracking the encryption and tainting the experiment > is to great, and the mere possibility would be enough for most > skeptics > to rule out any positive results that were made. The whole point of publishing the cryptext and the algorithm early and widely is to _permit_ public attack. The skeptic cannot rule out the possibility that a surreptitious attack would be mounted even if these were not published, so there's nothing to lose (and everything to gain) from making them public and encouraging cryptanalysis attempts. If they are not published, this does not give the skeptic any more reason for confidence; rather the reverse. In the case of a publicly available alogrithm that had proven resistant to cryptanalytic attack, the skeptic might have a suspicion but would have to account for the failure of public cracking attempts. There would still be serious methodological problems with this whole method, however, as we have both agreed. [...] -- Email handle is time-encoded to foil spammers. Use recent handles only. Filter on domain name only. http://www.sherilyn.org.uk/ Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/ Before you buy. ###### From: PZ Myers Newsgroups: alt.out-of-body Subject: Re: Testing for "Survival" Evidence Organization: Nailbunny's Hammer References: <3a0446c6.184771432@cnews.newsguy.com> <6u1yyb582j.fsf@chonsp.franklin.ch> <39CD1E52.41709C49@visi.net> <8qjkh40lm9@edrn.newsguy.com> <39CD669E.7C0FA76B@visi.net> <8qkr14$ec5$1@nnrp1.deja.com> User-Agent: MT-NewsWatcher/3.0 (PPC) X-Homepage: http://homepage.mac.com/myers/ X-Face: .k!7leh{iTz*Ah$8`'u'O$.4Z9+jOYL|yvi39v4fL-Un]RqYdDRAg*#o{3f|Mkzf8+}'2AmMD7_7`BM/X]H1nvmSDn*M0vfiwKn^3R[Kr_o*'>L@wBpFy>X&moPw Lines: 57 Date: Sun, 24 Sep 2000 12:30:16 GMT NNTP-Posting-Host: 206.146.116.34 X-Complaints-To: abuse@onvoy.com X-Trace: news7.onvoy.net 969798616 206.146.116.34 (Sun, 24 Sep 2000 07:30:16 CDT) NNTP-Posting-Date: Sun, 24 Sep 2000 07:30:16 CDT Path: chonsp.franklin.ch!pfaff.ethz.ch!news-zh.switch.ch!newsfeed-zh.ip-plus.net!news.ip-plus.net!news.tesion.net!news.belwue.de!news.uni-stuttgart.de!rz.uni-karlsruhe.de!schlund.de!newsfeed01.sul.t-online.de!newsfeed00.sul.t-online.de!t-online.de!diablo.theplanet.net!xfer13.netnews.com!netnews.com!upp1.onvoy!onvoy.com!news7.onvoy.net.POSTED!myers Xref: chonsp.franklin.ch alt.out-of-body:52079 In article <8qkr14$ec5$1@nnrp1.deja.com>, Sherilyn <582@sherilyn.org.uk> wrote: > In article <39CD669E.7C0FA76B@visi.net>, > John Garrison wrote: > > Sherilyn wrote: > > [snip] > > Correct, and the encryption helps to prevent cracking, thus "false" > > hits. (although truth be told I don't know how many mediums out > > there are computer crackers in their spare time) > > There are many computer crackers, and some of them are going to > regard any encryption scheme a challenge. [...] [snip] > > > > > They should publish it widely well before they expect to die, but > > > only after destroying the random plaintext. > > > > I don't know that I agree with that. I think that one or two > > trusted sources should be given the file. If the file is mass > > distributed the chances of someone cracking the encryption and > > tainting the experiment is to great, and the mere possibility would > > be enough for most skeptics to rule out any positive results that > > were made. > > The whole point of publishing the cryptext and the algorithm early > and widely is to _permit_ public attack. The skeptic cannot rule out > the possibility that a surreptitious attack would be mounted even if > these were not published, so there's nothing to lose (and everything > to gain) from making them public and encouraging cryptanalysis > attempts. If they are not published, this does not give the skeptic > any more reason for confidence; rather the reverse. In the case of a > publicly available alogrithm that had proven resistant to > cryptanalytic attack, the skeptic might have a suspicion but would > have to account for the failure of public cracking attempts. There > would still be serious methodological problems with this whole > method, however, as we have both agreed. > > > [...] I was making a slightly different argument against the whole idea. I am presuming that it is possible to make an encrypted message that is totally unbreakable by any code cracker; the weak point of these schemes then becomes not the message itself, but the humans involved in creating the initial code. If there is anything that mediums and psychics are good at, it is human engineering. The more effort put into designing an intricate code, the more they'll crow about it if they find a backdoor approach that circumvents the whole thing. -- PZ Myers ###### From: "Cathy Credulous" Newsgroups: alt.out-of-body References: <3a0446c6.184771432@cnews.newsguy.com> Subject: Re: Testing for "Survival" Evidence Lines: 19 X-Priority: 3 X-MSMail-Priority: Normal X-Newsreader: Microsoft Outlook Express 5.50.4133.2400 X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V5.50.4133.2400 Message-ID: Date: Sun, 24 Sep 2000 10:13:49 -0400 NNTP-Posting-Host: 204.255.212.119 X-Complaints-To: abuse@bcpl.net X-Trace: news.abs.net 969804715 204.255.212.119 (Sun, 24 Sep 2000 10:11:55 EDT) NNTP-Posting-Date: Sun, 24 Sep 2000 10:11:55 EDT Path: chonsp.franklin.ch!pfaff.ethz.ch!news-zh.switch.ch!news-ge.switch.ch!newsfeeds.belnet.be!news.belnet.be!news.tele.dk!4.1.16.34!cpk-news-hub1.bbnplanet.com!news.gtei.net!nntp.abs.net!news.abs.net!not-for-mail Xref: chonsp.franklin.ch alt.out-of-body:52022 "B.D. Yager" wrote in message news:NShz5.2470$L41.1157626@homer.alpha.net... > Hello Haunter-Dude! :) > While this may be interesting... IMO, it's a bit moot. Why? Because > (IMO)... once a person is deceased, he/she ceases to see anything but folly > in the efforts of the living to "prove" anything about the other side. They > will find out, soon enough... one at a time! > Alrighty, but how did you find out that a deceased would "see anything but folly in the efforts of the living to prove anything about the other side"? -- Love from Cathy ###### Path: chonsp.franklin.ch!not-for-mail From: Neil Franklin Newsgroups: alt.out-of-body Subject: Re: Testing for "Survival" Evidence Date: 25 Sep 2000 01:26:46 +0200 Organization: My own Private Self Lines: 197 Message-ID: <6u4s354bih.fsf@chonsp.franklin.ch> References: <3a0446c6.184771432@cnews.newsguy.com> <6u1yyb582j.fsf@chonsp.franklin.ch> NNTP-Posting-Host: chonsp.franklin.ch X-Trace: chonsp.franklin.ch 969838006 796 10.0.3.2 (24 Sep 2000 23:26:46 GMT) X-Complaints-To: news@chonsp.franklin.ch NNTP-Posting-Date: 24 Sep 2000 23:26:46 GMT X-Newsreader: Gnus v5.7/Emacs 20.4 Xref: chonsp.franklin.ch alt.out-of-body:52093 PZ Myers writes: > In article <6u1yyb582j.fsf@chonsp.franklin.ch>, Neil Franklin > wrote: > > > PZ Myers writes: > > > > > Unless one has the key, and can encode and decode messages. > > > > What key? Trap door functions do not use keys. Simple: > > > > hash = tdf(plain) > > Picky, picky. The point is that Person A, while living, has to assemble > this algorithm, Nope. Person a has to select an password (= plaintext). The function tdf() is provided by the writer of the /etc/passwd program, and has been publically documented since somewhere between 25 and 30 years. > and pass it on to Person B, The computer. To be more precise the program /bin/login and the file /etc/passwd. > who will use the information > to verify a potential message from Person A after his death. Just like it did while A was still alive and typed it in. > have the problem of maintaining the security of the method, so that > Person B can't use it to fake messages, No one knows a method to do that. At least that is what the cryptographers all say. > or that Person C couldn't beg, > borrow, or steal the information beforehand. Mathematically impossible. One can not revers the trap door funktion. The exists no plain = reverse-tdf(hash). And the plain is not stored anywhere, other than the now-dead brain of A (and possibly the spirit of A, whose existence and channeling we are trying to test whether it is the case). > > > Here we go again, another heap of useless abstracts from Haunter, and > > > > Actually an report on an interesting idea for an test. > > I disagree. We aren't seeing believable plain English messages from the We see messages of unknown truth. This test is aimed exactly at providing an possibility to test such claimed messages for being true or not. > dead; why should we expect them to start communicating in code? No communicating in code, just remember and transmit an secret. > > > Note that we don't have any citation information. Where was this thing > > > > No need, as this is simply reporting on an idea to do, not on an > > actual experiment that has been run. No need to check it up. Now if > > Ah, you are ignoring Haunter's MO. He loves to associate people with Nope. I am discussing solely this particular post that you responed to, and in particular your false claim about cryptography. Other posts from Haunter are irrelevant to my point. > > PZ, I just hope your claims in biological/neurological stuff (which > > I can not verify due to lack of knowledge in that field) are better > > than the lack of knowledge of standard kryptographiv methods you have > > demonstrated in this post. > > I know very little about cryptography, which I freely admit. Well at least that. > mediumship is an attempt to gild a garbage heap. It *might* be useful to > verify the validity of a communications channel, but in this case, we > don't seem to have a useable channel, we don't have a method for sharing > cryptographic methods between sender and recipient, Perhaps we do, perhaps we don't. That is the purpose of the test: to find that out. And this method looks good: many test cases (deceased people who knew passwords), no living person knows the secret (so no cold reading), simple to explain how to do (channel password and type it in), clean undiscutable result (either the password works or not). > reason to think our mystical spiritual sender will have the capacity to > execute 'hash = tdf(plain)', No need to, /etc/passwd did that at the time the deceased changed his password the last time while living. The deceased only need to remember the password and channel it via the claimed medium. With other words: nothing more than every medium claims to be the case. > the more dubious the result will be (that is, if the code is > unbreakable, it just means that aspect will be touted heavily by the > paranormalists... If the password fits they will have all the reason to do so. > when the place where the scheme is most likely > compromised is in code generation). The code exists already, it has been subjected to crack-attempts for over 25 years. Anyone who manages to crack it has immediate access to all Unix boxes worldwide. Do you think that has not attracted more crackers than all paranormalists can afford? > > It's also a simply idiotic premise. Do ghosts sit around their palm > > > pilots after death, running messages through pgp so they can get an > > > encrypted data stream? > > > > Nope. They just happen to take secrets with them to the grave and then > > the medium claims to have access to such secrets. And here somebody > > has just noticed an verifiable type of secret. > > This is an idea that has been floating around for a long, long time. > Houdini left such a message behind -- not encrypted, but locked up and > held by someone he trusted. Who may have been non-trustworthy. Or cold read. YOu can not cold read a computer, particularily one who doesn't know the password either (it only knows the hash). > mediums failed to get it. What does anyone gain from adding a > cryptographic lock? It looks more impressive, is all. It's like > Houdini's escape acts, adding multiple layers of locks and chains, many > of which are misdirection -- when he gets through, it's by way of a back > door that circumvents at least some of them. That is what the crypto is for: there is no back door. > > Recieving the proper password (as proven by successfull login) in > > enough cases to make it unlikely that the medium knew the password > > It's a silly scheme because it just makes more elaborate a procedure > that hasn't worked in the past. Why not just use the combinations for > safes? Dying people could leave messages in a safe, for which they set > the combination and lock it up tight. More people with passwords than with safes? Passowrds being less likely shared than safe combinations (every users has their own, not just one per system)? > Then they just transmit the > combination through the medium after death. Do you mean no one has > thought of this before? Possibly they have. I have not bothered to read up on medium testing. I was responding to your claims about: a) no such cryptography existing (it does) b) the test not working (it will at least as good [1] as the safe) [1] note, standard scientific procedure: A good test is not defined by delivering a succesfull transmission, but rather by being an good method for finding out if a transmission was successfull or not. > Of course, there is still a major problem. Watch your favorite mediums I have no favourite medium, so I can not watch them. > in action sometime -- van Praagh, or Edwards, or whoever. They'll > sputter out lines of BS like, "I'm getting a 'J' sound -- who had a > loved one named Joe, or John, or Jim?" Do you think that approach will Standard cold reading. Now try that with an computer who itself doesn't know the password. If your medium can cold read that, then they deserve faim, for doing that :-) -- Neil Franklin, neil@franklin.ch.remove http://neil.franklin.ch/ Nerd, Geek, Hacker, Unix Guru, Sysadmin, Roleplayer, LARPer, Mystic ###### From: Sherilyn <582@sherilyn.co.uk> Newsgroups: alt.out-of-body Subject: Re: Testing for "Survival" Evidence Date: 24 Sep 2000 14:41:07 -0700 Organization: Extra Newsguy News Service [http://extra.newsguy.com] Lines: 18 Message-ID: <8qlsdj01if2@edrn.newsguy.com> References: <3a0446c6.184771432@cnews.newsguy.com> NNTP-Posting-Host: p-560.newsdawg.com Path: chonsp.franklin.ch!pfaff.ethz.ch!news-zh.switch.ch!newsfeed-zh.ip-plus.net!news.ip-plus.net!news.tesion.net!news.belwue.de!news.uni-stuttgart.de!uni-erlangen.de!newsfeeds.belnet.be!news.belnet.be!news.tele.dk!204.94.211.44!enews.sgi.com!pln-w!spln!dex!extra.newsguy.com!newsp.newsguy.com!edrn Xref: chonsp.franklin.ch alt.out-of-body:52169 In article , "Cathy says... > > >"B.D. Yager" wrote in message >news:NShz5.2470$L41.1157626@homer.alpha.net... >> Hello Haunter-Dude! :) >> While this may be interesting... IMO, it's a bit moot. Why? Because >> (IMO)... once a person is deceased, he/she ceases to see anything but folly >> in the efforts of the living to "prove" anything about the other side. They >> will find out, soon enough... one at a time! >> > >Alrighty, but how did you find out that a deceased would "see >anything but folly in the efforts of the living to prove anything about >the other side"? It figures. They don't call. :) ###### From: Sherilyn <582@sherilyn.co.uk> Newsgroups: alt.out-of-body Subject: Re: Testing for "Survival" Evidence Date: 24 Sep 2000 14:45:41 -0700 Organization: Extra Newsguy News Service [http://extra.newsguy.com] Lines: 28 Message-ID: <8qlsm501ivm@edrn.newsguy.com> References: <3a0446c6.184771432@cnews.newsguy.com> <6u1yyb582j.fsf@chonsp.franklin.ch> <39CD1E52.41709C49@visi.net> <8qjkh40lm9@edrn.newsguy.com> <39CD669E.7C0FA76B@visi.net> <8qkr14$ec5$1@nnrp1.deja.com> NNTP-Posting-Host: p-709.newsdawg.com Path: chonsp.franklin.ch!pfaff.ethz.ch!news-zh.switch.ch!newsfeed-zh.ip-plus.net!news.ip-plus.net!news.tesion.net!news.belwue.de!news-stu1.dfn.de!news-mue1.dfn.de!news-nue1.dfn.de!uni-erlangen.de!newsfeed.germany.net!newsfeed01.sul.t-online.de!t-online.de!newspeer.clara.net!news.clara.net!diablo.netcom.net.uk!netcom.net.uk!enews.sgi.com!pln-w!spln!dex!extra.newsguy.com!newsp.newsguy.com!edrn Xref: chonsp.franklin.ch alt.out-of-body:52175 In article , PZ says... > >In article <8qkr14$ec5$1@nnrp1.deja.com>, Sherilyn ><582@sherilyn.org.uk> wrote: > >> >> The whole point of publishing the cryptext and the algorithm early >> and widely is to _permit_ public attack. The skeptic cannot rule out >> the possibility that a surreptitious attack would be mounted even if >> these were not published, so there's nothing to lose (and everything >> to gain) from making them public and encouraging cryptanalysis >> attempts. [...] > >I was making a slightly different argument against the whole idea. I am >presuming that it is possible to make an encrypted message that is >totally unbreakable by any code cracker; the weak point of these schemes >then becomes not the message itself, but the humans involved in creating >the initial code. If there is anything that mediums and psychics are >good at, it is human engineering. The more effort put into designing an >intricate code, the more they'll crow about it if they find a backdoor >approach that circumvents the whole thing. I think John and I are both in agreement with you about the weakness of the human link--it's always possible that the originator of the plaintext would secretly give it away to a stooge, and eventually someone mysteriously shows up with this information. ###### Message-ID: <39CE8DBA.73194BB6@visi.net> From: John Garrison X-Mailer: Mozilla 4.73 [en] (X11; U; Linux 2.2.12-20 i586) X-Accept-Language: en MIME-Version: 1.0 Newsgroups: alt.out-of-body Subject: Re: Testing for "Survival" Evidence References: <3a0446c6.184771432@cnews.newsguy.com> <6u1yyb582j.fsf@chonsp.franklin.ch> <39CD1E52.41709C49@visi.net> <8qjkh40lm9@edrn.newsguy.com> <39CD669E.7C0FA76B@visi.net> <8qkr14$ec5$1@nnrp1.deja.com> <8qlsm501ivm@edrn.newsguy.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Lines: 39 Date: Sun, 24 Sep 2000 19:26:50 -0400 NNTP-Posting-Host: 209.8.199.97 X-Trace: firenze 969838186 209.8.199.97 (Sun, 24 Sep 2000 19:29:46 EDT) NNTP-Posting-Date: Sun, 24 Sep 2000 19:29:46 EDT Path: chonsp.franklin.ch!pfaff.ethz.ch!news-zh.switch.ch!newsfeed-zh.ip-plus.net!news.ip-plus.net!news.tesion.net!news.belwue.de!news.uni-stuttgart.de!rz.uni-karlsruhe.de!schlund.de!newsfeed01.sul.t-online.de!t-online.de!newspeer.clara.net!news.clara.net!feed2.onemain.com!feed1.onemain.com!feeder.qis.net!newsxfer.visi.net!206.246.194.3.MISMATCH!firenze!not-for-mail Xref: chonsp.franklin.ch alt.out-of-body:52285 Sherilyn wrote: > > In article , PZ says... > > > >In article <8qkr14$ec5$1@nnrp1.deja.com>, Sherilyn > ><582@sherilyn.org.uk> wrote: > > > >> > >> The whole point of publishing the cryptext and the algorithm early > >> and widely is to _permit_ public attack. The skeptic cannot rule out > >> the possibility that a surreptitious attack would be mounted even if > >> these were not published, so there's nothing to lose (and everything > >> to gain) from making them public and encouraging cryptanalysis > >> attempts. > [...] > > > >I was making a slightly different argument against the whole idea. I am > >presuming that it is possible to make an encrypted message that is > >totally unbreakable by any code cracker; the weak point of these schemes > >then becomes not the message itself, but the humans involved in creating > >the initial code. If there is anything that mediums and psychics are > >good at, it is human engineering. The more effort put into designing an > >intricate code, the more they'll crow about it if they find a backdoor > >approach that circumvents the whole thing. > > I think John and I are both in agreement with you about the weakness of > the human link--it's always possible that the originator of the plaintext > would secretly give it away to a stooge, and eventually someone mysteriously > shows up with this information. Sure, but is there any way to NOT have some weakness in a test for this subject matter? If not then can we say that science is incapable of proving such a thing? If so than it just seems rather silly to keep demanding scientific proof. -- "I'm willing to J.O.B., just not on no jagg-off shoe-shine tip" "Jagg-off shoe-shine tip?" "No *background-checking* jagg-off shoe-shine tip" ###### Message-ID: <39CE8E88.661B18F4@visi.net> From: John Garrison X-Mailer: Mozilla 4.73 [en] (X11; U; Linux 2.2.12-20 i586) X-Accept-Language: en MIME-Version: 1.0 Newsgroups: alt.out-of-body Subject: Re: Testing for "Survival" Evidence References: <3a0446c6.184771432@cnews.newsguy.com> <6u1yyb582j.fsf@chonsp.franklin.ch> <39CD1E52.41709C49@visi.net> <8qjkh40lm9@edrn.newsguy.com> <39CD669E.7C0FA76B@visi.net> <8qkr14$ec5$1@nnrp1.deja.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Lines: 34 Date: Sun, 24 Sep 2000 19:30:16 -0400 NNTP-Posting-Host: 209.8.199.97 X-Trace: firenze 969838392 209.8.199.97 (Sun, 24 Sep 2000 19:33:12 EDT) NNTP-Posting-Date: Sun, 24 Sep 2000 19:33:12 EDT Path: chonsp.franklin.ch!pfaff.ethz.ch!news-zh.switch.ch!newsfeed-zh.ip-plus.net!news.ip-plus.net!news.tesion.net!news.belwue.de!news.uni-stuttgart.de!rz.uni-karlsruhe.de!schlund.de!newsfeed01.sul.t-online.de!t-online.de!newspeer.clara.net!news.clara.net!btnet-peer!btnet!newsfeed.direct.ca!look.ca!newsxfer.visi.net!206.246.194.3.MISMATCH!firenze!not-for-mail Xref: chonsp.franklin.ch alt.out-of-body:52279 Sherilyn wrote: > > > Well, I could give lots of examples, but then you'd say that it was > > likely just cold reading, and then I'd point out that my point was > that > > these studies help rule out cold reading and not that these instances > > were indeed "believable plain English messages" and then you would > tell > > me that I DID mean that the messages were believable plain English > > messages and accuse me of backpedalling. Sorry Sherilyn, I enjoy this > > nice rational conversation too much to start playing that game again. > > What is rational about claiming that there are believable messages > from the dead when you have now admitted that they could be cold > reads? You _have_ back-pedalled, and radically so. > You really can't read can you Sherilyn? I haven't back pedalled at all. What I said is that we can't say for certain whether there has been believable messages from the dead because we can no rule out cold reading, and that that is not the same as never having had believable messages from the dead. That is in and of itself not a claim that we HAVE had believable messages from the dead, just that we can't be sure that we have or haven't. I can see I am going to have to start putting up my disclaimers after every post again. Just out of curiousity does anyone else in the newsgroup besides Sherilyn, PZ, and other antagonizers have any difficulty understanding what I said? I didn't think so. -- "I'm willing to J.O.B., just not on no jagg-off shoe-shine tip" "Jagg-off shoe-shine tip?" "No *background-checking* jagg-off shoe-shine tip" ###### From: PZ Myers Newsgroups: alt.out-of-body Subject: Re: Testing for "Survival" Evidence Date: Sun, 24 Sep 2000 19:22:57 -0500 Organization: Nailbunny's Hammer Lines: 31 Message-ID: References: <3a0446c6.184771432@cnews.newsguy.com> <6u1yyb582j.fsf@chonsp.franklin.ch> <6u4s354bih.fsf@chonsp.franklin.ch> NNTP-Posting-Host: p-258.newsdawg.com User-Agent: MT-NewsWatcher/3.0 (PPC) X-Homepage: http://homepage.mac.com/myers/ X-Face: .k!7leh{iTz*Ah$8`'u'O$.4Z9+jOYL|yvi39v4fL-Un]RqYdDRAg*#o{3f|Mkzf8+}'2AmMD7_7`BM/X]H1nvmSDn*M0vfiwKn^3R[Kr_o*'>L@wBpFy>X&moPw, Neil Franklin wrote: [snip] > > or that Person C couldn't beg, > > borrow, or steal the information beforehand. > > Mathematically impossible. One can not revers the trap door > funktion. The exists no plain = reverse-tdf(hash). And the plain is > not stored anywhere, other than the now-dead brain of A (and possibly > the spirit of A, whose existence and channeling we are trying to test > whether it is the case). Exactly! It is mathematically impossible, so it will be touted as a major feat. However, you've also made the same assumption that the psychic frauds hope for: "the plain is not stored anywhere". How do you know that? It often *is* stored somewhere, and this is the weak link in your plan. If the message is accessed by a medium, we still have two alternatives: that it really is a message from the dead, or that Person A left the password scribbled on a chewing gum wrapper in his wallet. Which do you think is more likely? [snip] -- PZ Myers ###### Message-ID: <39CEB7BA.A6FAB066@visi.net> From: John Garrison X-Mailer: Mozilla 4.73 [en] (X11; U; Linux 2.2.12-20 i586) X-Accept-Language: en MIME-Version: 1.0 Newsgroups: alt.out-of-body Subject: Re: Testing for "Survival" Evidence References: <3a0446c6.184771432@cnews.newsguy.com> <6u1yyb582j.fsf@chonsp.franklin.ch> <6u4s354bih.fsf@chonsp.franklin.ch> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Lines: 47 Date: Sun, 24 Sep 2000 22:26:02 -0400 NNTP-Posting-Host: 209.8.199.97 X-Trace: firenze 969848938 209.8.199.97 (Sun, 24 Sep 2000 22:28:58 EDT) NNTP-Posting-Date: Sun, 24 Sep 2000 22:28:58 EDT Path: chonsp.franklin.ch!pfaff.ethz.ch!news-zh.switch.ch!newsfeed-zh.ip-plus.net!news.ip-plus.net!News.Amsterdam.UnisourceCS!skynet.be!europa.netcrusader.net!4.1.16.34!cpk-news-hub1.bbnplanet.com!news.gtei.net!newsxfer.visi.net!206.246.194.3.MISMATCH!firenze!not-for-mail Xref: chonsp.franklin.ch alt.out-of-body:52293 PZ Myers wrote: > > In article <6u4s354bih.fsf@chonsp.franklin.ch>, Neil Franklin > wrote: > > [snip] > > > > or that Person C couldn't beg, > > > borrow, or steal the information beforehand. > > > > Mathematically impossible. One can not revers the trap door > > funktion. The exists no plain = reverse-tdf(hash). And the plain is > > not stored anywhere, other than the now-dead brain of A (and possibly > > the spirit of A, whose existence and channeling we are trying to test > > whether it is the case). > > Exactly! It is mathematically impossible, so it will be touted as a > major feat. > > However, you've also made the same assumption that the psychic frauds > hope for: "the plain is not stored anywhere". How do you know that? It > often *is* stored somewhere, and this is the weak link in your plan. > > If the message is accessed by a medium, we still have two alternatives: > that it really is a message from the dead, or that Person A left the > password scribbled on a chewing gum wrapper in his wallet. Which do you > think is more likely? Well, it isn't a simple as the person writing the password down on a sheet of paper. The medium would still have to get a hold of it. Which means the loved ones of the dead person would have to find the password. It means that they would have to associate the password with the computer (assuming they are even aware of the experiment in the first place) it means that the medium would have to cold read a randomly chosen set of numbers and letters that are CASE SENSITIVE. Which means that the person originally finding it would have to be computer adept to realize that the letters are case sensitive. Said person would also have to memorize the password. I agree that the human factor is a problem, that isn't in dispute, but it is no where near as easy as you make it sound. I for one have no record of any of my passwords accept in my head. If I were participating a such an important study I would be double sure to keep it that way. -- "I'm willing to J.O.B., just not on no jagg-off shoe-shine tip" "Jagg-off shoe-shine tip?" "No *background-checking* jagg-off shoe-shine tip" ###### From: "B.D. Yager" Newsgroups: alt.out-of-body References: <3a0446c6.184771432@cnews.newsguy.com> Subject: Re: Testing for "Survival" Evidence Lines: 35 X-Newsreader: Microsoft Outlook Express 4.72.3110.1 X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V4.72.3110.3 Message-ID: Date: Sun, 24 Sep 2000 21:29:59 -0500 NNTP-Posting-Host: 156.46.129.186 X-Complaints-To: abuse@alpha.net X-Trace: homer.alpha.net 969848796 156.46.129.186 (Sun, 24 Sep 2000 21:26:36 CDT) NNTP-Posting-Date: Sun, 24 Sep 2000 21:26:36 CDT Path: chonsp.franklin.ch!pfaff.ethz.ch!news-zh.switch.ch!news-ge.switch.ch!news.maxwell.syr.edu!howland.erols.net!cpk-news-hub1.bbnplanet.com!cambridge1-snf1.gtei.net!news.gtei.net!homer.alpha.net!not-for-mail Xref: chonsp.franklin.ch alt.out-of-body:52160 Cathy Credulous wrote in message ... > >"B.D. Yager" wrote in message >news:NShz5.2470$L41.1157626@homer.alpha.net... >> Hello Haunter-Dude! :) >> While this may be interesting... IMO, it's a bit moot. Why? Because >> (IMO)... once a person is deceased, he/she ceases to see anything but folly >> in the efforts of the living to "prove" anything about the other side. They >> will find out, soon enough... one at a time! >> > >Alrighty, but how did you find out that a deceased would "see >anything but folly in the efforts of the living to prove anything about >the other side"? > >-- >Love from Cathy > Same way you found out they wouldn't. B.D. > >