From: Haunter@castles.com (Haunter)
Newsgroups: alt.out-of-body
Subject: Edwin May on CIA's StarGate experiments
Date: Sat, 18 Mar 2000 13:19:22 GMT
Organization: AlteredState Imaging/Psi App/WCS
Lines: 38
Message-ID: <38e48242.69018403@cnews.newsguy.com>
NNTP-Posting-Host: p-981.newsdawg.com
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
X-Newsreader: Forte Agent 1.5/32.452
Path: chonsp.franklin.ch!pfaff.ethz.ch!news-zh.switch.ch!news-ge.switch.ch!enews.sgi.com!pln-w!spln!extra.newsguy.com!newsp.newsguy.com!enews4
Xref: chonsp.franklin.ch alt.out-of-body:35929

THE AMERICAN INSTITUTES FOR RESEARCH REVIEW OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE'S STAR GATE PROGRAM: A COMMENTARY 

By Edwin C. May 

Cognitive Sciences Laboratory, 330 Cowper Street, Suite 200, Palo
Alto, CA 94301 

ABSTRACT: As a result of a Congressionally Directed Activity, the
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) conducted an
evaluation of a 24­year, government­sponsored program to investigate
ESP and its potential use within the intelligence
community. The American Institutes for Research (AIR) was contracted
to conduct the review of both research and
operations. Their September 29, 1995 final report was released to the
public November 28, 1995. As a result of AIR's
assessment, the CIA concluded that a statistically significant effect
had been demonstrated in the laboratory but that there was
no case in which ESP had provided data that had ever been used to
guide intelligence operations. This paper is a critical review
of AIR's methodology and conclusions. It will be shown that there is
compelling evidence that the CIA set the outcome with
regard to intelligence usage before the evaluation had begun. This was
accomplished by limiting the research and operations
data sets to exclude positive findings, by purposefully not
interviewing historically significant participants, by ignoring
previous
extensive Department of Defense program reviews, and by using the
questionable National Research Council's investigation of
parapsychology as the starting point for their review. Although there
may have been political and administrative justification for
the CIA not to accept the government's in­house program for the
operational use of anomalous cognition, these external
considerations appeared to drive the outcome of the evaluation. As a
result, they have come to the wrong conclusion with
regard to the use of anomalous cognition in intelligence operations
and have significantly underestimated the robustness of the
basic phenomenon.